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NARRATIVE IDENTITY AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN TWO HISTORICAL MODELS OF IDENTITY: A SOCIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE

Zsuzsanna BÖGRE¹

Abstract

The current concepts of identity widespread throughout social sciences are basically linked to two historical models. One is connected to psychology, while the other is related to sociology. In psychology, the concept of identity is traditionally considered to come from the work of Erik Erikson, who considers that identity is to be found in the deep structure of personality. Erikson studies the development of identity. He attributes central importance to the question of man's inner unity. In sociology, the concept of identity is usually linked to George Herbert Mead, who traces identity back to interaction between the individual and society. According to this, identity is shaped by social conventions, which can be conveyed by a profession, a role or a social situation. As those constantly undergo change, the individual's identity is continuously changing as well. Erikson's is regarded as an essentialist approach, whereas Mead's is called a constructivist one. The problem is not that there are differences between these two historical models, but that their adherents never or hardly ever reflect upon each other's views. A solution to this problem could be offered through the concept of narrative identity, to which the author of this study attributes a bridging role, due to the recent appearance of several new theories which consciously undertake to "reconcile" the two historical models ("the double track"). The present study starts by describing the development and deepening of the current chasm between the two historical models. Next, it outlines several theories of narrative identity which are becoming increasingly popular both in sociology and in psychology. While the influence of the two historical models can also be detected in the theories of narrative identity, they make a perceivable effort to play a bridging role. If sociology wants to use narratives as sources in the research of identity, it should take into account the fact that the individual is striving to reach a kind of inner identity and stability even in late modern circumstances. Likewise, if narratives are to be used for research in psychology, it must be acknowledged that social circumstances in our modern world are extremely changeable, which hinders the formation of a stable, inner

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identity core. I suggest that that narrative identity started to be seen as bridge. In sociology, no reflection upon this process has begun yet. The aim of this study is to articulate the problem and to promote further reflection in sociology and psychology as well.

Keywords: two historical models of identity, personal identity and stability, social construct, situational identity, narrative identity.

Introduction

Nowadays, it would be hard to understand social sciences without knowledge of the two historical models. One model is linked to psychology, while the other is connected to sociology. In psychology, the concept of identity is usually traced back to Erik Erikson (1991; 1994), who claims that identity is to be found in the deep structure of personality.

In Erikson's view, society plays a part in the development of and changes in identity. However, he focuses on the process of the individual reaching their inner identity and stability.

In sociology, the concept of identity can be linked to George Herbert Mead (1973), who attributes the development of identity to interaction between the individual and society.

This means that identity is shaped by social conventions, which can be conveyed by professions, roles or social situations, which constantly change in society. Thus, the identity of the individual also changes.

We can best understand and interpret the concepts of identity which have been gaining popularity since the beginning of the 20th century (particularly as regards the development of the two historical models) by going back to their "common ancestor" and trying to track the changes in the use of this concept.

An important role was played here by the American philosopher and psychologist, William James (1983), whose concept of identity has had a major effect on identity concepts both in psychology and in sociology.

Since James the concept of identity has developed numerous branches. Both disciplines have adopted those of James's ideas, which they consider important for the understanding of identity.

Many have become involved in the two historical models in numerous ways, and this has resulted in a confusing multitude of concepts of identity.

This study mentions the following topics: Firstly, it deals with the causes of the chaos surrounding the concept of identity. Secondly, it gives a more detailed description of James' concept of identity, which the author considers to be the common precursor of both the sociological and the psychological model. Thirdly,

it outlines the positions of some of the supporters of the psychological model, indicating its branches. After that, it discusses the concepts of identity in sociology.

Subsequently, the theories of narrative identity are presented, with a focus on the influence of the two historical models. Finally, the study describes approaches which endeavour to bridge the gulf between the two historical models.

In the author's opinion, the concept of narrative identity, especially life histories as narratives, are used as sources by both sciences. For this reason, when interpreting life histories (identities), one must be aware that an individual's life happens in a society which is constantly changing. On the other hand, we must also accept the fact that the individual would like to hold on to something and reach relative stability in their own identity. In other words, theories of narrative identity should deal with both the sociological and the psychological aspects of identity.

This study would like to draw attention to some newly emerged approaches (discussed hereunder in more detail) which constitute rapprochement of the two historical models.

The two historical models of identity and their common "ancestor"

Historical and genealogical research demonstrates the different interpretations of identity in the two historical models, as well as their multiple branches. (Pataki, 2008; Stachel, 2007; Gleason, 1983, 1983; Hammack, 2015; Pléh, 1992, 2015; Gecas, 1982, 1982).

It is crucial to note, however, that it is not the existence of different models that poses a problem but the fact that researchers do not reflect critically upon them. (Stachel, 2007; Gleason, 1983)

There could be several reasons for that, such as the fact that the different schools either do not know about each other or that they simply ignore the concepts which differ from their own. (Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx, 2011)

American historian Philip Gleason (1983) described the two models in relation to particular disciplines and authors. He points out that one model is based on psychology and Erik Erikson, while the other is related to sociology, and primarily to George H. Mead and symbolic interactionism. (Hammack, 2015; Ashmore, & Jussim, 1997). In other words, the interpretations of the concept of identity diverge both by author and by discipline.

When writing about identity, Pataki Ferenc (2008) also discusses the two historical models of the self-concept. He reaches the conclusion that the differences between the two concepts have deep roots which deal with the ontological status of the self. Accordingly, we either regard the self as an independent entity, attributing essentiality, and consequently, independent action to it, or we regard it as a product of mental representations. In other words: the two models either talk about the stability of the self or the opposite thereof, i.e. its changeability.

William James, the common ancestor

American psychologist and philosopher William James destroyed the coherent self-concept of earlier philosophies, thereby providing a basis for the current concepts of identity. (Pataki, 2008). His approach has influenced both Erikson and today's developmental and personality psychology, as well as Mead and current constructivist concepts (McAdams, & McLean, 2013; Pléh, 2015; Ashmore, & Jussim, 1997; Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx, 2011). James' approach was complex enough for both psychology and sociology to draw upon it.

James was interested in topics like coherence, the maintenance of a sense of continuity, the self and contact with the social meanings of the outer world. James views the unity/coherence of the self as the individual's task. At the same time, he also takes into account the dialogue between the individual's inner and outer processes.

Regarding the continuity and coherence of personal identity James claims that they are mental processes which we perceive in the same way as we perceive physical warmth.

James (1890/1983)¹ destroyed the indivisible self of philosophy, making a distinction between "pure ego" (the I) and the empirical Me. Hence, he introduced an approach which sees the self as the knower and the object of knowing. The Me is the objectified I when we are reflecting upon ourselves while experiencing the state of our subjective self as well.

He ushered in modern thinking about a multi-layered self, which created both relative stability and tension for the individual at the same time.

Herewith, James referred to the multifaceted self in which there is a dynamic relationship full of tension between the selves. To James, a multifaceted self did not mean the fragmentation of the self, because he pointed out that the individual should choose the self-most suited to them, one that she/he can identify with. The example he gave in support of his argumentation is that we cannot excel at sport and philosophy at the same time, since such a thing is impossible. Thus, James was involved in a selection of the elements of identity and deemed that such a selection can ensure the maintenance of a coherent self. (James, 1891, 1983)

As mentioned before, James has influenced, albeit differently, the self-concepts of psychology and sociology. Each discipline adopted from James' legacy the thoughts compatible with their own models, thereby providing a foundation for the two historical models. While the Eriksonian line in psychology emphasized the experiencing of the inner self and the identity thereof, Mead's line in sociology gave priority to social interaction. The latter examined the role of the meanings and categories of the outside world, which then led to the concept of self-construction. (Csepeli, 2018)

Let us begin with one of these historical models: the approach widespread in psychology.

One historical model: emphasis on the inner core of personality

Erik Erikson was born in Germany. However, being of Jewish descent, he had to flee to America during World War II. As a clinical psychologist in the US, he dealt with identity problems in adolescence, and his views on this topic became popular. He had an influence beyond psychology, with his ideas becoming well-known in sociology and cultural anthropology as well.

The centrepiece of Erikson's theory (1991, 1994) is constituted by the development of identity as a result of "successful" completion of human life stages. Individual stages of life end in crises, the resolution of which leads to a new life stage. In the centre of all this is development in adolescence². In their analysis, McLean and Syed (2015) point out that Erikson describes three levels of work on identity, the complexity of which is largely ignored by the followers of this concept. In his approach to inner identity, Erikson relies on Freud's division into instinct - ego - superego.

The first level is "ego identity", which comprises personal continuity, allowing the individual to integrate their important and personal idea of self. This is the level that records the narrative about the self, which is unique, rooted in the past and gives meaning to the individual's existence.

The second level is personal identity. Basically, this is the process whereby the individual internalizes their goals which follow from their culture, from the relevant roles and positions which they occupy. This is the level (the concrete roles and commitment to them) that can be best studied from the point of view of identity status.

The third level is social identity. This is where the individual has contact with larger groups, their ethnicity, gender and nation. Erikson integrates the three levels into one. (Hammack, 2008; Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx, 2011). In the process of integration, childhood identities appear in a self-representation in adulthood. The latter becomes coherent, and consequently a commitment to their role and culture emerges in the adult person. (Erikson, 1994).

In Hammack's view (2015), Erikson's theory also provided a broader and more integrative perspective in terms of the individual's psychological and social changes as well. His theory first became widespread in psychology, later becoming increasingly popular³ in other social sciences as well. (Gleason, 1983)

Now we move on to discuss the identity concepts of the other historical model, widespread in sociology.

The other historical model: emphasis on identity as a social construct

In this section we must start by talking about Mead, who cannot be left unmentioned in connection with identity in sociology. At the same time, it must be stressed that, in addition to Mead, there have been other authors involved in this topic, contributing to a sociology-based identity concept. For this reason, we will start by discussing the theory developed by Mead, who has had a major influence. Then we will turn to other authors and outline their research topics that have made an impact on the identity concept of sociology.

In contrast to Erikson, Mead initiated a new approach to this topic by primarily tracing the development of the Self back to social interaction.

Mead too drew upon James' legacy insofar as he was also interested in the question of the relationship between the self and the outer world as well as the division of the self into "pure ego" (the I) and the objectified Me. In James' thinking, the Me assumes multiple roles from society, which also influenced Mead.

Mead (1973) left his mark on sociology through the identity theory based on symbolic interactionism. This theory plays a key part in society assuming a decisive role in terms of identity.

The fundamental question of symbolic interactionism is how the individual is influenced by the social Other. They give a constructivist answer to this question. The self is formed by the collective and, depending on the context, it changes its adaptation to its environment. According to this concept, the self is not constant, i.e., it does not have a previously given identity. In this model, the self is re-formed in each new situation, and it is only held together by a thin thread of memories. In symbolic interactionism, the individual interprets symbols (meanings) by first trying to predict how their environment will respond to their actions, and then, based on that, altering their actions. The essence of altered action is the common interpretation.

On the one hand, Mead talks about the minimal self, which is a result of the perception of our body. On the other hand, this body perception self as a subject (I) is able to interact with others, thus becoming a "Me". This is what is called the reflected self. It is the minimal self that enables us to interact with others as an "I", and it is thanks to this that a "Me" is formed. In this sense, the self is a three-phase process only able to exist in society.

Interestingly, this question has been treated differently in psychology. Pléh (2015) points out that in psychology the relationship between the constructs of the ego and those of the Other (alter) was neglected for a long time, with mainstream psychology researching the layers of personality with no regard for the question of representation by others. It was not until the end of the twentieth century that the situation changed, and a kind of synthesis began to emerge.

Connected to Mead there have been several theories which emphasised the importance of the social context of identity. For example, Goffman's *stigma theory* (1981), McCall and Simmons' (1978) *role identity model* and Stryker's (1968) *identity theory*. It is also important to mention Tajfel and Turner's (1979) *social identity theory*, which highlights the role of social groups in the formation of identity.

Below, there is a brief description of the most important claims made in those theories.

In his book *Stigma*, which was published in 1963, Goffman (1981) started to use the term 'identity' instead of 'self'. The theoretical background to stigma and identity management theory is based on *the self-presentation of role theory*. The author uses theatrical events as examples to show the nature of social interaction. Goffman's concept of identity also has three levels, i.e., he also has a complex approach to this phenomenon. In his theory, ego identity provides a sense of subjective identity and continuity, social identity is related to social roles, statuses and categories, while personal identity means self-representation in one's life history. Stigmatized identity gives information as to which particular aspect of personal identity the self is showing. Goffman's concept of identity takes a step further by equating identity with social relationships.

In their *role identity theory*, McCall and Simmons (1978) stress the role of social interaction as well. Role identity is an early integrative version of the concept of identity. This theory pointed out the identity-forming function of an individual's roles and social positions. According to McCall, the meanings of daily interactions are reinforced by the "imaginative view" of the self. This concept was to become the precursor of narrative identity in cultural psychology (Bruner, 1990; McAdams, & McLean, 2013; McAdams, 2011; John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008). The adherents of this concept regarded role identities as culturally based areas. In other words, role identity is a product of socialization whereby specific categories and positions of the social matrix are internalized.

Role identity theories integrate James and Mead's earlier social and personal identity concepts, with the addition that social interaction shows role identity. While role identity maintains the focus on personal identity, it also highlights the context of social categories, social positions, meaning and values. In this sense, role identity theory is an integrative concept of identity that several social scientists are still trying to formulate. (McAdams, & McLean, 2013; McLean, & Syed, 2015; Hammack, 2015; Schwandt, 2011)

Social identity theory (SIT) emerged in British social psychology in the 1970s. (Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979) This concept is linked to Allport work as well as to Mead's social interaction theory. According to the authors, Turner and Tajfel, social cognition is based on self-categorization, which is related to positive and negative values. Basically, people strive to create a positive self-image, which they try to maintain through their actions. This theory deals with

people's belonging to nations, races, ethnic groups, or other groups smaller than these. The theory (SIT) goes beyond the explanation of belonging to a group and conflicts between them. Through identity processes, this concept explains social change as well. In the authors' view, low-status groups change status hierarchy during mobility, social creativity, competition and the fight for higher statuses. All these aspects play a role in the individual's struggle for positive recognition. Traditionally, SIT examines the individual's belonging to a group and how all this influences behaviour within a group, i.e., collective behaviour. However, it pays less attention to the development of identity, for example, to the question of how group belonging emerges in the individual. The latter tends to be the subject of personal and developmental psychology.

Having discussed the two historical models and some theories closely related to them, we now move on to the question of narrative identity.

Narrative identity

The idea that the individual creates their identity by constructing stories dates from the 1980s (McAdams, 2011; Kovács, & Vajda, 2002; Hammack, 2008). Developmental psychology came up with the idea that the determining character of identity is created in personal narratives – the philosophical inspiration underlying this concept is Ricœur's work (Ricœur, 1984). Bruner (1990, 2001) had a similar opinion and stressed that it is through narratives that we formulate our meanings relating to the world. American sociologist McAdams (1985) came up with the idea that identity can also be conceived of as an internal story or personal myth. He says that if we could “see” identity, it would look like a story, which he called a “product”. If identity is a product, then discovering/exploring it is also possible through a story.

Under the influence of the above-mentioned authors, narrative identity research has been linked to life history research. Many authors are of the opinion that we are best able to express our identity by telling our life history. (Bögre, 2018; Kovács, 2004.) Narrative identity has by now become an interdisciplinary issue, which justifies the call for urgent reflection upon identity theories.⁴

Coherent narrative identity, a coherent life history

The influence of the two historical models can be felt within the concept of narrative identity as well. According to one of the tracks (models), the individual integrates stories into their life history that give a certain degree of coherence, purpose and meaning to their life. When the individual gives a subjective account of their own development, their main beliefs, work and loved ones, narrative identity connects their personal past and imagined future. It provides a moral justification for who the individual has been and who they will become. The

individual starts working on their narrative identity in their late adolescence and reaches a kind of unity/coherence by early adulthood. It should be noted that this work is a lifelong process because we continuously keep interpreting our lives through narratives. As a result of this process, we construct more or less coherent life histories which we can tell others (McAdams, & McLean, 2013; McAdams, 2011; Pléh, 2015). We must bear in mind that narrative identity reveals as much of an individual's life as much of culture (McAdams, 2006; McAdams, & Guo, 2014; Pataki, 2008; Hammack, 2015) because personal narratives intertwine with collective "master" narratives, which can be linked to individuals' social status (McAdams, & Guo, 2014; McAdams *et. al.*, 2008; Hammack, 2008). Narrative identity theories stressing coherence are close to Erikson's approach.

Performance narrative identity, performance life history

However, denying the possibility of achieving coherence in our modern society, supporters of the other concept of narrative identity criticise the former one. For instance, the sceptics of late modern society do not believe that it is possible to create a coherent self, because they think the self can rarely achieve any kind of coherence/unity. According to them, modern man's self-image tends to be fragmented and has multiple standards. Among other explanations, they cite rapidly changing social circumstances, the fragmentation of time and space as well as the gradual decline in communities' stability as reasons. (Giddens, 1991). Therefore, however, narratives are only able to show fragments of identity and can merely reveal various 'colours' of the self (Hermans, 1996).

Similarly, Raggatt (2006) considers an integrative role of narratives impossible, the reason being that today's society is too complex and inconsistent for individuals to reach an Eriksonian coherence of identity. He too thinks that the different narratives constructed by the individual contradict each other. Other adherents of this line are Gergen (1991), Thorne and Mearns (2000), who are of the opinion that personal histories can be less integrative and that they are of lesser significance and ephemeral. There are yet others to dispute the central role of storytelling in self-development like McLean and Pasupathi and Pals (2007), who claim that it is situated stories which play an important part.

Like in Mead's theory, these concepts stress the social construct character of the self, rather than the perception of the inner process of identity development. In the latter approaches, the emphasis on cultural processes is important.

All the above demonstrates that there is a fracture even within the concept of narrative identity, which indicates the influence of the two historical models. Constructivist theories are often suspicious of the statement that man's identity is integrated. Instead, constructivism uses the term "performative" identity, which is characterized by situational, specific norms and discursive conventions (Kovács, 2011). The above-mentioned authors talk about the self being continuously

rewritten, with narratives changing as required by specific situations (Bamberg, Fina, & Schifflin, 2011).

Adherents of coherence raise multiple questions regarding the latter trend. For example, social psychologist Ferenc Pataki asks how the self, if it is regarded as situational identity, looks back on the past and how the individual can look at the future. Can we be certain that we perceive and evaluate everything through the filter of the present? Or do temporal and spatial characteristics go far beyond the particularities of the direct perception of the present? How are situational experiences recorded and used for and in the future? (Pataki, 2008, 426). Such questions are yet unanswered.

A minimal consensus on concepts of narrative identity

After the description of the two differing concepts of narrative identity, it is time to discuss considerations which try to reconcile them. The golden middle way stems from authors who have tried to find a common denominator between personal and social aspects, between integrative and situational representations (McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich, 2006).

We can see an attempt at reconciling the two concepts in some of McAdams' earlier (1985) and later (2006, 2008, 2011) writings. Back in 1985, McAdams viewed narrative identity simply as a bunch of internalized and continuously developing self-stories that give the individual's life apparent coherence, a purpose, and a meaning. Narrative identity links the individual's personal past, i.e., their subjective account of their own development, their main beliefs regarding their work and their beloved ones, with the imagined future.

This concept was later gradually modified by the author and later (2006) he admitted that few people experienced a coherent, completely integrated identity. At the same time, during his research he found that man does need a degree of coherence, a purpose, and some integration. People search for a purpose and meaning in their lives. This led him to make the concession that narrative identity does not have to be complete and it will not be total, yet people strive to achieve relative coherence and a purpose. This endeavour, albeit limited, is what narrative identity is capable of.

Besides McAdams, another American social psychologist, Hammack (2008, 2015), also regards his own concept of identity as integrative.

Identity creates the coherence and continuity of the individual's inner world but at the same time it also separates the individual from the meaning categories of the outer world. Identity works both on the individual's psychological level and on the organizational level of the social world. In his concept, he is influenced by James (1890), Mead (1934) and Tajfel (1981). He emphasizes that an individual's thinking, emotions, and actions are considerably influenced by social identity. Hammack has also dealt with the mediating function of language, which led him to narrative theories, as it is important for the study of the development of identity.

Indirectly, American sociologist Margaret Somers (1994) reinforces the rapprochement which originated in psychology. According to Somers, psychologists are biased when it comes to the relationship between narratives and the self as they say that the source of the narrative is the individual. She claims they still talk about it even if, to some extent, they take into consideration the mutual influence of social structure and interpersonal relations. Thereby, Somers acknowledges that psychologists have become open to admitting the influence of social structure. However, she does not say whether sociology has come any closer to the positions of psychology.

Both McAdams and Hammack are authors with a background in psychology, which implies that, for the time being, the reconciliation of narrative identity theories seems to be an attempt on the part of psychology.

Based on the experience of life history research, there are five kinds of features which can be used as a starting point for an integrative concept of narrative identity.

1) According to the first common feature, the self can be expressed in a story (Bruner, 1990). Stories are told about all spheres of life. It is their stories that introduce and best represent an individual (Ricoeur, 1984).

2) The main function of stories is integration. (McAdams, 2011). However, in modern life, the integration of their life history presents the individual with a real challenge. (Giddens, 1991) There are those, like McAdams, who examine integration in a complete life history, (1985) and there are those who only look at it in specific parts of life histories. (McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007)

3) The stories that are told appear in social relations. Nobody can tell a story without including historical time and its meaning, geographical location and its meaning or a cultural interpretation of the events happening to the individual.

4) Stories change over time. McAdams' research (2006) shows that the stories in life histories vary because people tell stories about their lives depending on specific situations. Notwithstanding, he claims that individuals try to achieve a minimal level of consistency in their life histories. With this statement, McAdams took a few steps towards the integration of the two tracks. Due to the simultaneous emphasis on both situational identity and the endeavour to achieve consistency, the conflict between the two tracks seems to have begun to be resolved.

5) Some parts of a life history are more interesting than others. There are historical and personal periods and stages of life which are easier to represent in life histories because they are more coherent, more complex, and thus they are likely to attract more interest in society. For example, generally, people like talking at length about their childhood, which they depict as either negative or positive. And the childhood memories described are given an important part in the interpretation of later events in the life history, in understanding why the individual's life took a specific turn. This example shows that when individuals talk about their lives, they strive to create some coherence in it.

These statements can hardly be regarded as steps towards building a bridge between the two concepts of narrative identity. Still, they indicate a need for an integrated approach to narratives.

Summary

The two historical models of identity have influenced later theories such as McAdams's and Hammack's conceptions. The following points summarize the differences between the models: 1. According to one of the models, identity *exists* and refers to an inner thing which can stay stable despite constant changes. Erikson says that identity is in the deep structure of personality. Identity is shaped by interaction between the person and society, but despite all changes and crises, in the depth of their existence, the individual experiences their inner identity and stability with increasing certainty. 2. The second model claims that identity is a product of the interaction between the individual and society, determined by a name and a role which develop according to the rules of social conventions. It can be said that the constructivist approach presents a challenge to those schools of thought which stress the "is-ness" of identity.

From the perspective of sociology, identity is not uniform, or a given entity. It is the product of a dynamic and non-linear process. In a constantly changing society, it is shaped by situations which the individual takes part in and which memory holds together.

Nowadays, it is becoming increasingly clear to researchers of identity that there is a link between life histories, identity, and narratives. The different approaches of the two historical models, dubbed "double track" by the author of this study, have also had an impact on the theories of narrative identity. Initially, the predominant opinion in the concept of narrative identity was that narratives create a coherent identity, whereby it followed the Eriksonian view. Gradually, more and more social scientists began to think that this was impossible in modern circumstances, and instead of the coherence of narratives, many believe that stories depend on momentary situations, which cannot ensure the coherence/unity of identity. This approach follows Mead's view, which emphasizes cultural determination.

Recently, some authors like McAdams and his colleagues and Hammack have reflected upon the two differing approaches within narrative identity, attempting to reduce the distance between them. In their work, the two historical models have started to converge within the concept of narrative identity. The bridge building has only just started, so the present study can merely describe a few early steps. Ones which have been taken to reach a minimal consensus. Based on some authors' work, it would therefore appear that narrative identity is suitable for connecting the different concepts of identity.

Although both sociology and psychology regard the concept of narrative identity as their field of research, it seems that rapprochement between the two approaches

has only started from psychology. It remains to be seen how the supporters of rapprochement will gather strength and which discipline will be stronger.

Further research and more studies are needed to discuss the connections between narrative identity and sociology and psychology in more detail.

Notes

¹*The Principles of Psychology* by William James was first published in 1890.

²Erikson's concept of identity was described in detail in an excellent study by László János (László, 1999).

³Erikson's popularity at the time is evidenced by the fact that he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his book on Gandhi.

⁴Despite the interdisciplinary use of narrative identity, this study remains in the domain of sociology or psychology.

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