THE BORDER IS NOT THE TERRITORY:
THE SECURITARIAN-HUMANITARIAN DIALECTIC
AND THE OUTSOURCING OF EUROPEAN BORDERS

Dragoș COSTACHE

Sociologie Românească, 2020, vol. 18, Issue 2, pp. 163-174

https://doi.org/10.33788/sr.18.2.8

Published by:
Expert Projects Publishing House

On behalf of:
Asociația Română de Sociologie
THE BORDER IS NOT THE TERRITORY: THE SECURITARIAN-HUMANITARIAN DIALECTIC AND THE OUTSOURCING OF EUROPEAN BORDERS

Dragoș COSTACHE¹

Abstract

At the core of the European projects there is a fundamental tension between the securitarian and the humanitarian aspects of border and foreign policy, especially in its response to the Mediterranean Migration Crisis. This tension has far reaching consequences, from the outsourcing of border controls to third party states to fundamental changes in the makeup of the European Project. Starting from Etienne Balibar’s seminal question “what makes a border” I explore several facets of European border enforcement and the impact it is having on the European project.

Keywords: migration, borders, border security, humanitarian response, crisis response.

Prologue - 2015

Bucharest’s main airport, Henri Coandă International likes to bill itself as a modern, efficient transportation hub, one in tune with, if not at the forefront of Romania’s transformation from a failing Eastern transition country to a productive workfare member of the EU. On its website, the airport, if we regard it as a Gestalt entity, prides itself on its new travel app, twin business lounges, its new terminal and, curiously, its recent celebration of Saint Patrick’s Day, a saint inexistent in Romania’s Orthodox Christian calendar.

Yet, if we’re to engage in an ethnographic flight of fancy and treat the airport as a research site, bigger concerns than whether the travel app is compatible with Android as well as iOS pop out. The laminated plastic and chrome walls, outwards markers of progress are riddled with crudely taped-up posters of fearful women and big, bold fonts decrying the fate of ‘tricked’, ‘trafficked’ and ‘exploited’ women urging passers-by to not become another victim. The logos of the Romanian

¹ University of Amsterdam Alumni, Amsterdam, OLANDA. E-mail: tsavatar@gmail.com.
Border Police and, occasionally, of the EU or the Romanian-Swiss Cooperation Group adorn these posters. “The authorities care about your fate” the posters seem to say, “Particularly if you’re a victim and not a perpetrator”. If we engage in another ethnographic layover, this time in Amsterdam’s Schiphol, a larger, more sophisticated airport, suddenly the concerns seem to change. Displayed in glass panel poster cases and on wall mounted monitors amidst couture ads, the Dutch posters seem to have a lot more to say about the bringing in of fake designer goods, exotic plants and animals or toy weapons than about saying no to trafficking. This is, of course, in spite of the much larger and lucrative sex work sector in the Netherlands that is usually associated with the overarching concern over human trafficking in state humanitarian discourses (Surtees, 2008). And yet despite its outwards lack of manifestation, the Dutch state is very much concerned with the trafficking of persons. So much so that Schiphol, apart from its prayer room, massage parlor and dim-sum bar has several other amenities that Henri Coandă can only dream of. Schiphol has an on-site summary judgement court dealing with drug and immigration cases and two separate detention centers for immigrants and asylum seekers euphemistically called ‘border hospices’. The Netherlands is also one of the most proactive EU countries in terms of border enforcement, Dublin Protocol asylum denials and is a one of the member states that has repeatedly vetoed Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the Schengen treaty out of border security concerns (Pop, 2011). Border security seems to definitely be part and parcel of the Dutch governmental mindset and, while there is a place for victims in Dutch border law, the perpetrator is at the forefront here.

This short diatribe about trafficking posters helps us frame the two facets of the European border discourse: the humanitarian discourse of the migrant as victim, who often has to be saved from himself and the more unpopular but just as present securitarian discourse of safeguarding the outer borders of the EU from ‘mass immigration’. These two concepts are intrinsically entangled in dialectic at the European level, with national governments leaning one way or another depending on political leanings and short term needs.

The purpose of this paper is to ‘unpack’ this dialectic and emphasize the irrelevance of both narratives in the face of other processes like the militarization of border regimes and the ‘outsourcing’ of enforcement to the private sector and third countries. Furthermore, in the face of technological advances, ‘humanitarian’ breaches and legal statute changes for migrants and asylum seekers I argue that the border is no longer a demarcation line but a fluid framework for enforcement that can manifest itself at any point within or outside the territory of a nation state.

The problem of the European border policy and of European policy in general lies in its intrinsic duality. The EU exists as both supranational entity with interest groups and pressures of its own (Grande, 1996) and as series of often conflicting nation-state interests. It is also a problem of the willing manipulation of the humanitarian-securitarian paradigm.
Humanitarianism entered our extended vocabulary somewhere in the eighties and despite losing its mot du jour status to ‘trade’ in the nineties, ‘terrorism’ in the eighties and the couplet of ‘crisis’ and ‘economy’ in the difficult teens it is still a powerful word in the modern citizen’s civic dictionary. Humanitarianism in theory is what the ‘haves’ do for the ‘have nots’, a latter day ideology of impermanent, voluntary social justice. And yet, as Didier Fassin has shown us (Fassin, 2007, 2012) the field of humanitarianism transcends the ideational and the ideological and reconstitutes itself as a field of politics and governance. As William Walters points out (Walters, 2011, 143), Fassin delineates that humanitarianism-as-governance often bypasses what we think of as the main implement of governance, the state, and becomes the levy of third party actors in various contexts. Fassin’s humanitarian government does not deal in nationhood but in ‘human collectivities’ (Fassin, 2007, 150) and their administration towards requisite social ends. And yet the humanitarian border regime, while it employs the rhetoric of safeguarding the vulnerable it often upsets this very concept of ‘human collectivities’. Several of the ethnographic vignettes in Ruben Andersson’s book Illegality inc. (Andersson, 2014, 111, 153, 177-183) present failures of humanitarian government in its employ as part of the border regime. Red cross camps, asylum seeker ‘border hostels’ even the security apparatus repurposed as humanitarian patrol are either appropriated to the other side of the humanitarian-securitarian paradigm or outright fail. An even better example of this is the failure and withdrawal of the humanitarian regime in the case of the Choucha Camp (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Bumstead, 2015). The humanitarian subject, abandoned reverts to the state of the undesirable, best handled by the securitarian border regime. Of course, as Walters points out (Walters, 2011, 146-147), one should not think of the distributed, self-organized humanitarian regime as the crux of a state’s policy. It is a tool to be used in parallel with the security regime and the gradual militarization and outsourcing of the border. Secondly it is a local process. The humanitarian border appears on site, interplays in a complex manner with the state’s ‘classic’ security solutions and disappears when it is no longer ‘needed’. Thirdly it often disappears before its ‘humane’ mission is over as seen it the case of Choucha and the overall status of refugee status foreign nationals in Tunisia.

The securitarian part of the border couplet needs much less introduction. For the past 25 years we have seen a gradual increase in border security measures, measures that the vast majority of the population experiences only as increased security at the airport check-in. For the ‘have-nots’ that the humanitarian paradigm is theoretically addressing the consequences of the tightening up of border security have been much more widespread, from the professionalization of people smuggling that is widespread in the literature (Ferrucio et al., 2007; DeHaas, 2007; Andersson, 2014) to the precariousness that it fosters amongst the migrants themselves (Holmes, 2013; Anderson, 2010; McLaughlin and Hennebry, 2010). The mass deaths in the Mediterranean today are an indirect consequence of the tightening up of asylum
policies across Europe and the continued economic ‘pull’ factors. But just as the humanitarian paradigm has its political uses, the securitarian one does as well.

As Cuttita points out there are often different phases or ‘acts’ in any border narrative. In fact the idea of the ‘border spectacle’ is a recurrent one in literature (Andersson, 2014; DeGenova, 2012), referring to a ‘performance’ of humanitarian and securitarian alternate approaches to satisfy different parts of the electorate and interested parties. There are different local and regional reasons for this alternate, contradictory approach but the superseding framework is that pointed out in the beginning: that of nation-state needs versus European common needs and third party pan-European interests. A significant slice of these interests are economic. It’s become somewhat of a cliché to mention that Europe despite its border policy needs an infl ow of migration. Whether approaching the issue from a New Economics of Labor Migration (Castles et al., 2013, 243-247) of pull/push factors and Appadurai-an flows or a purely demographic one Europe’s population deficit is a significant one. Not only is the average EU birthrate below the natural replacement level but the continued and uncontested population mobility of the West, the labor-force delay brought forward by the GEC and a perceived sense of ‘global responsibility’ about overpopulation and the future of children in a post-Fordist but not post-scarcity society drives the European demographic deficit higher every year. The European-style welfare society cannot survive without new labor, yet that labor, although desired and imported, is willfully driven underground into a state of exploitative precariousness that is outside the social welfare net if not the social compact altogether yet still contributes to it through indirect taxation measures like VAT. The demographics are intrinsically tied to the economics of migrant labor precariousness, another quick fact that is omnipresent within scholarship but willfully ignored outside it. In order to compete, bloated, over subsidized, European market sectors like the agricultural industry or low turnover service sectors like the restaurant business or home care desperately need a migrant of an uncertain legality. In a parallel to the so-called free trade of the NAFTA system (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2007), this type of migrant can be easily exploited for his labor in exchange for low wages and no benefits associated with the welfare state and in case the parameters change (unionization, legalization etc.) the migrant can simply be pushed out, passively even deported. Yet these two oft-discussed factors of the economic compact that drive the so-called ‘pull factors’ of labor migration come face to face with other established interests that come on the other side of the migration issue. These ‘push away’ factors are one of the prime areas where state sovereignty and the duty of bordering are divested by the state within the confines of the market.

The first market to which power is outsourced could be said to lie at the very heart of the current migration crisis in the Mediterranean. The divesting of visa enforcement to air and sea carriers can be argued (Walters, 2002) to be at the core of the reduction is European overall asylum claims and hence the rise in alternate entry (Andersson, 2014). The laying of the asylum burden at airlines’
feet while a current practice nowadays, codified in European asylum law was a quintessentially German invention. The 1987 amendment (BGBI. I S.92) to the German asylum law imposed a penalty of 2000 marks on any airline that carried an ‘illegal’ migrant to Germany, while also forcing said airline to shoulder the costs for the deportation procedure. The 1987 German law, like its Europe-wide successor, EU directive 2001/51/EC, does not apply these penalties in the case of ‘legitimate asylum’ seekers falling under the protection of the Geneva Convention. In practice, however, as Menz points out (Menz, 2012) this has led to a total halt in airline asylum seekers. Outsourcing visa enforcement to profit seeking organizations under threat of serious financial liability, and especially to the airline industry, one in perpetual crisis has led to a complete denial to board of any passengers in possession of a passport but not the requisite visa. Airlines and boat lines are neither qualified to tell apart ‘legitimate asylum’ seekers from so-called illegal labour migrants nor do they have any incentive to. The virtual halt of airline access for refugees and poorer migrants, as opposed to wealthier migrants who can afford the financial risk that comes with forged paperwork has all but ensured that the former take to the sea. And that is where a secondary market comes in. There can be no argument towards the extent the European border has become securitized in the past two decades. While this can be seen generally as a tendency of the aforementioned humanitarian-securitarian security nexus there is a third facet of the border ‘spectacle’ that transcends the ideas of security and policing as well as humanitarianism directly into the realm of militarization. Jill Williams (Williams, 2014) retells the Australian ‘humanitarian gift’ of two frigates to the Sri Lankan Coast Guard. Ruben Andersson (Andersson, 2014) does an extensive inventory of the military equipment, both air and sea based used in Spanish or rather European border policing efforts in the Mediterranean. And the frigates and patrol boats used by the Italian Coast Guard play different roles, of watchdog or rescuer, depending on the ‘act’ in the border spectacle. There is a red-thread, running throughout the humanitarian-securitarian complex and that thread is weaponized. The impact of the European military industry lobby on border policy is discussed at length by Andersson in his book Illegality Inc. It is also well ingrained in European legislation like the aforementioned security directives acquis that Romania had to implement as an EU candidate. The lobbying pressure of military and security giants can have significant impact on local policy and even local economy. A wide ranging scandal in Romania (Georgescu, 2014) has implicated military conglomerate EADS and fictitious contracts totaling almost half a billion euros to secure Romania’s borders. EADS has a history of lobbying pressure and questionable military deals (Spiegel, 2012) that have reached to the highest echelons of European politics. Yet the impact of the border industry is not restricted to the European territory. In its dual-play of humanitarian and security-centric facets of the border enforcement nexus states have found it often easier to pass on the task of enforcing borders to regional partners. There is already a European and international humanitarian infrastructure
through the UNHCR, DG AID, MSF and similar organizations, though their efficiency is often debatable, as seen in the case of the Choucha camp. It is only a logical extension of Foucauldian neoliberal governmentality that the ‘hollowing out’ of state bordering responsibilities (Walters, 2011) extends from the realm of the humanitarian into that of security. A low key, localized, example of this we can find, once more in Andersson’s ethnography. One of Illegality Inc.’s vignettes presents Senegalese beach patrolmen that have been equipped and paid direct wages by European governments in order to enforce border security at a distance. The beach police’s quad bikes, communication gear and even gas stipends all come from the Spanish government (Andersson, 2014, 98-107). After the Canary Island crisis died down so did the funding. Much more preeminent examples of the state divesting its border enforcement not only into international waters but across sovereign states can be seen through international agreements both within the EU and abroad. Perhaps the classic example of border and asylum outsourcing are the European Dublin protocols. The fingerprint-on-site clause acts as a frontier buffer for Northern European states who hold the privileged position whereas the southern states have to take the brunt of the asylum flow. When the system breaks down or is perturbed, as in the case of the 2013 Libyan refugee crisis, European states in the North are quick to react. When Italy ‘allowed’ thousands of refugees to embark northwards, France threatened to re-institute border controls and therefore break down the Schengen treaty. Meanwhile, talks of a more equitable European Asylum system have so far been avoided. The true ‘outsourcing’ of European borders, however, happens not within the theoretically ‘free moving’ Europe but outside it, in the periphery and even across the African continent, as the above case of Senegal shows. The borders of Europe are nowadays not guarded in Ceuta, Melilla, Fuerteventura or Lampedusa but outside, across Tunisia, Morocco or Algeria. For more than a decade Gaddafi played the role of main gatekeeper to Europe and Italy in particular and bilateral agreements with North African countries and, more recently, Middle Eastern countries like Turkey have been struck by European leaders as part of concentrated efforts to keep asylum seekers away from the physical borders of Europe through their outwards projection. Partner states often secure financial, trade or diplomatic privileges. What they do not secure is fair, accountable police treatment of migrants and refugees, nor the same humanitarian standards as the EU. In outsourcing its migration ‘problem’ and projecting its borders onto nearby states Europe blurs not only the physical border, but also the standards of its securitarian-humanitarian concerns. While both security and fair, humane treatment play an important role ‘at home’, divesting the problem to a third party, even one with a spotty human rights record against which there is growing evidence of human rights abuses (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Andersson, 2014) turns the problem of migration into an ‘away’ one, best treated through the ‘classic’ tools of diplomacy and aid. The occasional condemnation of abuse as in the aftermath of the 2005 massacre will often serve as enough of
a disclaimer for the political base. The ‘rational choice’ decision-making and the commodification of statist refugee policy is stripped of any pretenses abroad.

Because, as touched upon before, the concerns of the individual state as an actor and the EU as both actor and collection of divergent interests lies in the balance of interests and political capital. The European states are all democratic so there is a requisite need of a balancing out of tensions. And in recent years, there have been increased political pressures from within to reform migration policy and limit asylum and labor migration. These political interests have manifested in the rise of the anti immigration right as a political force. However, as discussed earlier, there is a strong need for a continued migration at the European level as well as a need to shore up the ‘industries’ that deal with immigrants from the private prison complex to European military concerns like EADS. So the state has to run a difficult high-wire act judiciously applying its own main resource, Power.

Walters discusses the birth of the idea of the humanitarian government extensively, through paraphrases and explications of Foucault and Fassin and with implication of the constitutive political role in the birth of the humanitarian regime and humanitarian border. Only fitting considering how applicative the two facets of Foucauldian discipline can be to the concept of the border securitarian-humanitarian duality. On the one hand we have the soft correcting of the ‘errant’, analogous to discipline, on the other the corrective application of force to stop the dangerous offender, in this case materialized as the economic migrant offender opposed by the border security apparatus. Yet as discussed, the border is no longer a line on the map nor even a frontier or a constitutive construct between selfhood and the rest as Balibar (Balibar, 2002) would have it. The postmodern border is a not a thickening of the line on the map but a smudging of the ink. The border is still physically present yet its effects are everywhere. The border is a Foucauldian application of power, ever-present, a permanent Panoptikon constructed in terms of benevolence and menace. The contemporary European democracy wins its power from the people and proceeds to starkly protect and gently oppress, for their own benefit of course, not only the outsider, but the insider as well. After all, if the border is the territory what would be the difference?

The difference arises in the amount of agency invested into the two classes of actors. As previously discussed both are necessary, the outsider migrant as an economic aid, cheap, necessary labor, and the insider citizen as the base of democratic power. Yet these two classes could not be further apart. The corrective, humanitarian aspect and the punitive securitarian aspect of the border-state are intertwined but they affect citizens differently. This is especially true in the case of Europe and its Schengen area. While the thinned out but ever-present border regime makes inter-state boundaries disappear for EU ‘free movers’, asylum seekers are very much restricted by the perpetual border. Their asylum claim is tied intrinsically to the first country of claim and their fingerprints are in an Europe-wide database turning any police officer Europe-wide into a border agent. Europeans are protected and often empowered by the perpetual border and pan-
European policies, migrants are singled out and location-bound. And this ‘thin’ travelling border extends to the European periphery. Tazzioli retells the tale of ‘legitimate’ refugees only tolerated in the south of Tunisia, Andersson talks about the covert tactics that migrants seeking entry to Europe use in Morocco to pass as tourists rather than migrants. Persecution of migrants in the Moroccan border regions is a recent phenomenon deeply intertwined with the extension of European border enforcement partnerships.

Between scientific-military advances, IT surveillance and the tightening of border regimes and asylum law, we can perhaps answer Etienne Balibar’s rhetorical question about what a border actually is. We are the border, the state and the sum totality of its citizens and ‘illegal’ guests. Together we are a divested, thin but ever-watching border population, all 500 million of us. Divided within ever-tightening border-groups we recreate the humanitarian – securitarian, self – other dialectic in smaller groups as we head towards the local and family unit level. We shift these dualities around, the women the Henri Coandă posters were addressing are ‘us’, deserving of aid and gentle correction, as are the unlucky travelers that bring unsafe foods or knock-off bags onto Schiphol. The migrants at the Schiphol detention center are not ‘us’ and therefore have to be kept behind fences and walls.

Yet, in the end only one dichotomy matters: that between the haves, the selves, the voters, the free movers, the citizens and the have-nots, the others, the laborers, the bound, the ‘illegals’. As the border spreads out across the territory and beyond the very democratic foundation of the European project becomes unwound. The basic idea behind a united Europe is to abolish large-scale conflict, to turn disagreements between parties and dualities into dialogue. With the rise of the anti-immigration right all across Europe, the slow politicized dismantling of the Geneva convention, ineffective asylum laws kept as status-quo and a continued drive for the illegalization of migrants the divide between the European self and the Immigrant other is deepened rather than narrowed and the presence of borders becomes ever more present. But the border is not the territory, the border is just an embodied concept and a line on a map. Yet if we let the European project become defined by continued surveillance and oppression of a part of its people, if we embody the self-other dialectic and let the fences of Ceuta and Melilla and the Humanitarian/Securitarian dialectic describe our borderlands we risk becoming like the last great Union that was defined by its border wall. And in 1989 even that wall fell.

Addendum: 2019 – On Walls and Panopticons. The better part of the above essay was written in a better time for musing about borders. Meanwhile, we have seen “Build the Wall” get a US President elected and we have seen European democracy quake from the Mediterranean Migration Crisis and its aftermath. Far right parties and platforms have thrived off the image of the dangerous jihadi in refugee clothing. Media events such as the Berlin Truck Attack have solidified the image of the asylum seeker as a ticking time bomb even as well integrated refugees become part and parcel of receiving states’ economies. Much as Balibar saw the
border become thin and dispersed throughout the body politic as an apparatus of control we have seen the fence, and those to be held behind it become thin as well, diffuse concepts meant to be seen throughout society in the guise of every stranger. Even the naïve posters on the walls of Otopeni Airport seem sinister now as networks of trafficked Romanian women reveal their horrid stories each year. The world has become a colder place for those escaping war or tragedy and Frontex has been quick to fill this anxiety void. Frontex is now an element of European pride, a powerful institution in its own right one often used by the EU in boastful Instagram posts. By 2027 Frontex will have over 10,000 permanent staff, including a corps of ‘return experts’. New treaties are being signed with border-states, such as the EU-Serbia agreement signed in November 2019. Pride-filled parallels are being drawn to the rise of Frontex by experts advocating for the gradual, almost mock-Deleuzian assemblage of some semblance of European Military. Yet while the border security apparatus of the European experiment has grown its humanitarian one has at least formally followed suit. The priorities, of course, are now different. In spring of 2019 the European Union officially declared the Mediterranean crisis to be over. The world’s largest international aid donor body now focuses increasingly on climate change and its mitigation. The ‘outsourcing’ of humanitarian intervention and security continues in countries increasingly at odds with European values, such as Turkey, countries whose regimes are now generating asylum seekers of their own. And then there is the never-ending carnage in Syria, one of the chief causes of the refugee waves that have stirred the ever excitable European far right but has elicited a much lesser response from a divided European Union. Years of war have led to one of the worst refugee crises in recent history, with over 5 million refugees (3.5 million of which are hosted by an increasingly authoritarian regime in Turkey with territorial designs on Syrian soil) and six million internally displaced. Yet there is no broad embargo, no concentrated military intervention and precious little humanitarian support. Meanwhile humanitarian further from European shores, such as the Venezuelan crisis of the past few years have been met with even less direct action and but a lot of diplomatic posturing.

Yet even in countries such as Romania, migration origin countries for EU ‘free-movers’ the winds of economic change are blowing and creating new, micro-level humanitarian crises. As labor shifts westwards the countries of the European east find themselves at a labor deficit, a deficit often overcome by the importing of cheap and tightly controlled foreign workers, mostly from south-east Asia. Often hosted in precarious conditions, underpaid and overworked this class of posted laborers is a market-friendly benign alternative to the ‘dangerous refugee’ and his panoply of international-treaty given rights. As borders tighten and the securitarian aspects of EU Border policy run rampant, the humanitarian concerns of admitting asylum-seekers, (doubled as they are by the cynical calculations of business workforce needs) fall by the wayside. After all, what need has Romania (or Europe for that matter) of a new culturally distinct citizen that has escaped the...
horrors of war, famine or poverty when it can settle for a poor posted labor ‘alien’ with few rights that will definitely return home once the contract is up. In today’s securitarian European border regime the Gastarbeiter most definitely goes home.

Slowly but surely the border becomes the territory, a perpetual panopticon for the policed bodies of the Others inhabiting the countries of the Self. But repressive regimes have a way of slowly expanding their grasp, drifting from those they are allowed to repress, to dissenters and the rest of society, squashing liberties and stifling democracy. Today, thirty years after the last great European wall dividing us fell we risk rebuilding it together, to great fanfare and cheers in the European borderlands haunted by the specter of the Other.

And, worryingly, there is also a “second wave” of individual walls erecting, in the aftermath of the Covid-19 Crisis. As bio politics becomes more and more focused on the biological there is perhaps for the first time talk of “immunity passports” and other surveillance mechanisms that seem born out of the worst excesses of an ever-encroaching risk society. And while there are limits to the critique of the securitarian virus, limits that some, like Giorgio Agamben trespass upon when they deem the epidemic (but not the virus) as “invented” (Agamben, 2020b) there is no mistaking of the restrictive potential of biosecurity (Agamben, 2020a) to the scope of human liberty. Particularly there is no mistaking the biosecuritarian impact on the rights and the bodies of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, legal or otherwise.

Epilogue - 2020

Bucharest’s main airport, Henri Coandă International likes to bill itself as a modern, efficient transportation hub, one in tune with, if not at the forefront of Romania’s transformation from a failing Eastern transition country to a productive workfare member of the EU. Yet in May 2020 there is no longer a need for flights of fancy to address rising concerns about subjects in the ethnographic site that is the airport. Because right outside the airport a chartered bus with 36 legal Sri Lankan laborers, who came to work in one of Romania’s northern counties idles on the tarmac as authorities struggle to decide what to do with a surplus of posted labor that is no longer necessary in the midst of a coronavirus lockdown. (Florea et al., 2020). Roused at night from their beds, zip-tied by security guards “because they had scissors” and shipped under escort on an eight hour charter bus ride to Bucharest’s modern and efficient transportation hub (currently undergoing further modernization) from where they have nowhere else to go, the legal Sri Lankan workers eagerly await their fate. Meanwhile, a week before to the day, coronavirus deniers assembled in one of Bucharest’s main squares had elicited very little response from tolerant authorities and wide ridicule from citizens of all stripes. Because when the securitarian paradigm turns biological its enforcement too falls upon biological lines and the no longer necessary laborer in his dormitory
is a larger security threat than the denier in the main square. But perhaps there is a silver lining. When guest laborers get restrained and forced marched to a dead-end airport and confused authorities struggle to come up with a destination for them maybe it is finally a sign that the EU’s “far east” is no longer a security threat. As the (bio-) securitarian paradigm is brutally enforced, Romania has finally come, in its own way, to the fray. Schengen admission is surely right around the corner.

References


Balibar, E. (2002). What is a Border? Politics and the other scene, 75-86.


Gesetz zur bunderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher und ausländerrechtlicher Vorschriften (buslandergesetz), v. 6.1.1987 (BGB1. I S.92) [Amendment of January 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens].


